We provide simple generalizations of the three principal theorems of general equilibrium (existence of equilibrium and the two welfare theorems). These enable us to (i) establish equilibrium existence in economies where Walras' Law does not always hold and (ii) show that the second welfare theorem follows from a revealed preference argument as simple as that normally used to prove the first welfare theorem.
1

Introduction
The three fundamental theorems of general equilibrium theory are the propositions that, under appropriate hypotheses, (i) a competitive equilibrium exists; (ii) a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient; and (iii) a Pareto efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with transfer payments. Of these theorems, assertion (ii) (often called the First Welfare Theorem) is mathematically virtually trivial, whereas the existence and decentralization results are usually considered "deeper."
In this paper, we will provide a simple generalization of the existence theorem to economies where Walras' Law (which asserts that the value of excess demand is zero)
need not be satisfied out of equilibrium. Assertion (iii) (the Second Welfare Theorem) is an almost immediate corollary of this generalization. Our approach makes it clear that,
given the existence of equilibrium, the first and second welfare theorems are equally "trivial"; indeed, we show that they can be proved in very similar ways.
We begin in Section 1 by establishing equilibrium existence for a "generalized competitive" mechanism. In Section 2 we apply this result to a "fixed allocation" mechanism. We take up the welfare theorems in Section 3. Section 4 discusses related literature, and Section 5 concludes.
1.
Generalized Competitive Mechanisms
Let the basic data of the economy be given by the specification of Notice that, in the first example above, the value of excess demand, The following is our basic existence result: Hence, 0 i z > . 4 This hypothesis can be relaxed using standard methods, as in Debreu (1959) . 5 The boundedness assumption can be dropped if we impose certain conditions on the aggregate production Q.E.D.
The Welfare Theorems
The first welfare theorem asserts that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
The natural generalization to our framework is the following 
5.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has reconsidered the principal theorems of general equilibrium theory.
We have argued that:
(A) There are interesting general equilibrium models in which Walras' Law fails to hold out of equilibrium.
(B) Equilibrium may nevertheless exist in these models because a weaker version of Walras' Law holds.
(C) If existence is taken for granted, the second welfare theorem-just like the firstfollows from a simple revealed preference analysis. The usual statement of the second theorem involves an existential claim that is the reason behind its mathematical "difficulty." Separation of the theorem into two parts-the existence part invoking the weakened Walras' Law-makes clear that convexity conditions may be needed for existence but not for the part of the theorem constituting its real substance.
